Welfare Traps in Australia: Do they Bite?
Survey
HILDA
Author(s)
Date Issued
2008
Pages
36
Abstract
Minimising disincentives to employment participation that arise as a consequence of
providing welfare has been a major objective of the recent welfare reform agenda in
Australia. Of particular concern have been the high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
and replacement rates (RRs) facing welfare recipients as a result of the interaction of the tax
and benefits system. Based on the financial-year income data contained in waves 1 to 4 of
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, the first part of this paper
presents estimates of EMTRs facing all working-age Australians and of an alternative
‘disincentive’ measure, participation tax rates (PTRs), for non-working Australians.
Significant innovations in the calculation of these measures are the incorporation of the
effect of the withdrawal of rental subsidies for public housing tenants, which have not been
included in the previous literature, and the allowance for changes in tax liabilities and
benefit entitlements for the income unit rather than just for the individual. We find EMTRs
and PTRs to have changed very little between 2000-01 and 2003-04, and to be particularly
high for recipients of NewStart Allowance. In the second part of the paper we estimate the
impact of EMTRs, the PTR and the more commonly used RR on the probability of transitions
from non-employment to employment one year later. The PTR and RR are found to be
superior to the EMTR in measuring disincentive effects for non-working persons. Second,
these effects do matter. High PTRs or RRs have a moderate but significant effect on the
probability that women will enter employment from outside the labour force, and a very large
(negative) effect on the probability that an unemployed person will find work.
providing welfare has been a major objective of the recent welfare reform agenda in
Australia. Of particular concern have been the high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
and replacement rates (RRs) facing welfare recipients as a result of the interaction of the tax
and benefits system. Based on the financial-year income data contained in waves 1 to 4 of
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, the first part of this paper
presents estimates of EMTRs facing all working-age Australians and of an alternative
‘disincentive’ measure, participation tax rates (PTRs), for non-working Australians.
Significant innovations in the calculation of these measures are the incorporation of the
effect of the withdrawal of rental subsidies for public housing tenants, which have not been
included in the previous literature, and the allowance for changes in tax liabilities and
benefit entitlements for the income unit rather than just for the individual. We find EMTRs
and PTRs to have changed very little between 2000-01 and 2003-04, and to be particularly
high for recipients of NewStart Allowance. In the second part of the paper we estimate the
impact of EMTRs, the PTR and the more commonly used RR on the probability of transitions
from non-employment to employment one year later. The PTR and RR are found to be
superior to the EMTR in measuring disincentive effects for non-working persons. Second,
these effects do matter. High PTRs or RRs have a moderate but significant effect on the
probability that women will enter employment from outside the labour force, and a very large
(negative) effect on the probability that an unemployed person will find work.
External resource (Link)
ISBN
ISSN 1329 - 2676
Subject Keywords
DSS Main category
DSS Sub-category
Type
Reports and technical papers
